Rezzo Schlauch: Rede/Essay zum Transatlantischen Verhältnis - April 2003 - Teil 2 The Drive Towards a Stronger Europe
In the post war period there was a dualism in West-German foreign policy
between the French and the Anglo-American orientation, between so called
Gaullists and the Transatlanticists. While Franco-German reconciliation
and European integration was of paramount importance for the rebuilding
of a friendly, integrated, post-nationalist Germany, security concerns,
cultural ties, admiration and gratitude made the US the most important ally
for West-Germany. With a common opponent in the East and a relatively modest
role for the West-German military, these two poles of Western integration
were relatively easy to balance. Despite occasional French-American tensions,
it was always feasible for Germany to steer the middle ground. European
integration and Transatlantic Partnership never appeared as alternatives
but as complements, two sides of Western integration.
Many foreign policy thinkers in Germany would like things to stay that way.
In the present context, they look increasingly nostalgic. As the senior
partner in the old transatlantic relationship decides to go it alone, the
geopolitical trend leaves us with Europe. But can or should an integrated
Europe be more of a counterpoise to American hegemony?
In a sense, the progressive building of an integrated Europe will necessarily result in certain split loyalties. The identity of citizens will be distributed between loyalty to the region, to the nation, to Europe, to the West as a wider cultural identity and to global citizenship in a cosmopolitan sense. The more important the European element of this layered identity becomes and the more cosmopolitan values in an age of globalization come to the fore, the more the identification with the "West" and therefore with "America" may loose in importance. The current American foreign policy stance may accelerate such a development.
There is of course the question of an independent European military force. Attempts to constitute an independent European defense and security force will gain momentum. A few weeks ago the EU has taken over the Macedonia mission from NATO. A small start, to be sure, but a potential beginning for more independence. And one outcome of the current disagreement has been the announcement of a new defense initiative by 4 of the core European states with an invitation to all others. Such independence is especially desirable in cases of conflict and peace-keeping missions in Europe's neighborhood. But since security concerns are global these days, it should extend to world wide abilities on a moderate scale. Such limited independence can make European dissent in geopolitical matters more credible.
Nevertheless, this can and will only go so far. Ultimately, Mr. Kagan and
others are right, when they say that America has preserved and upheld a
catalogue of martial and patriotic values that Europe has abandoned after
centuries of devastating historical experiences. Europeans do not really
want to fall back into a logic of strategic rivalry, military arms races
and balances of power. European societies would never be willing to spend
the enormous amounts of money for defense that would be necessary to balance
the American arsenal. Europe needs to gain independence from America in
its own defense affairs, but it will never be a strategic rival to the US
in terms of global military world ordering ambitions.
Joseph Nye has introduced the notion of "soft power" for the capability
to convince through the attractiveness of culture and political ideas, to
persuade and rule in cooperative structures. Europe´s strength is
and will be as a civil power, an economic and cultural player with strong
political influcence. Conflict prevention, economic strength, development
aid, intercultural dialogue, negotiated globalization; theses are Europe´s
virtues and contributions. With its soft power it may be able to exert influence
in the world and be an ally for a world public opinion. This alliance with
an emerging global civil society may sometimes work with the Americans,
as it has in the case of Afghanistan, but it may sometimes work against
America, as it has in the case of Iraq. Europe and the US then become rivals
in the battle for the hearts and minds. And the USA, until recently the
world champion of soft power knows how difficult it is to fight against
the hearts and minds, even with the most superior military force. Without
legitimacy, America cannot stabilize its lead status and Europe may be needed
to gain this legitimacy.
Such soft power could be exercised even if European integration takes more
time than some would wish. It may be waged in changing coalitions for a
while, coalitions of the unwilling. And Pentagon strategists now gleeful
about the European split in the Iraqi question should remember that soft
power is carried through popular opinion. On the level of popular opinion
on Iraq, Europe is already integrated. American prestige in polls throughout
Europe has dropped significantly. On the level of governments, as we all
know, a unified European defense and foreign policy does not exist. But
most governments that have steered a more Pro-American course have done
so against public opinion in their countries and they have been very moderate
in their support since the war began.
But despite all this talk of counterparts, military independence and soft
power alliances against America, the fact of the matter is: Ultimately,
the German people have no true desire to act as global power balancers.
The current sentiments throughout Europe are simply a reaction to the new
American strategy and action. The German American Marriage maybe in a rocky
period but Germany ultimately would prefer to remain in a transatlantic
security partnership. And I think and sincerely hope, so does America! So
let me ignore my partisan role here and as act as the marriage counselor!
Mutual Corrections - Towards a Transatlantic Reconciliation
Obviously, the many levels of cooperation and friendship between our countries
have not ceased to exist. They exist on an economic, cultural, political,
military and international police level. The transatlantic partnership is
far too stable for a vocabulary of rivalry to be appropriate. Germany remains
deeply Americanized and ultimately pro-American. The open dissent on Iraq
is an expression of confidence, based on the grounds of common cultural
and political values. This is a confidence among partners, which will remain
the model for the future. We will continue to cooperate on many levels but
we will also continue to assess US actions on a case by case basis. And
then sometimes, we will "beg to differ."
But we do not wish to differ for the sake of difference. I consider the
current rift as troubling in many respects. While America seems to loose
a sense for the value of European allies, Germans tend to forget what American
international involvment contributes to peace, stability, freedom and prosperity
in the world. So in order to stop the undeniable trend towards transatlantic
difference, both sides may have to rethink some of their positions. I would
like to point to a few topics for the future transatlantic debate.
1 - Mutual Dependence
Europeans know that the hard power of military force is sometimes necessary
and that there is only one global hegemon that can truly exercise military
power on a global scale in this age. And Europe also knows that in terms
of her value system there has rarely been a great power that has exercised
its dominance in more benign ways than the USA. The thought of any other
state of this world commanding such power at this moment sends shivers down
the veins of a new transatlantic German. The multilateral world order of
international law, humanitarian progress and globalized prosperity needs
a strong hegemon. The United Nations without America are weak and irrelevant.
And the security concerns of a hegemon that is objectively threatened from
many sides cannot be taken lightly.
But on the other hand, a world of constantly changing coalitons and diplomatic
alliances is not an option. Americans need to rediscover their sense of
diplomacy and their skills in exercising their power with convinced allies.
They need to realize, that in these globalized days it will not be possible
to arbitrarily exercise military predominance against a global economic
and cultural player with the weight of Europe. America needs European help
in many respects. Some are even from the realm of hard power like the international
campaign against terrorism.
2 - Security Concerns and Risk Assessment
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck has described the transatlantic discussion
in terms of a "radical contradiction in the perception of risk." While America is on constant terror alert, sees imminent threats from rogue
states and fears the mass destruction of global terrorism, Europe sees American
hysteria and fears the mass destruction of war. Europeans cannot continue
to play down American concerns. If they criticize the solution of disarmament
war, they have to come up with a real alternative. The privatization of
terror and the continued presence of weapons of mass destruction in this
world need a new global security system. That may in some cases limit the
sovereignty of states that have proven to be security risks.
But on this issue Americans need to realize that a one-sided emphasis on
national military confrontation and a series of disarmament wars is a highly
questionable response to this kind of threat. Limiting the sovereignty of
states that pose a risk for the privatized proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction must not mean invasion. Such an approach will not stop proliferation,
it may even provoke more. And, ultimately, risk annihilation is impossible!
The costs of a campaign to eradicate evil would be unimaginable evil itself
and it would be doomed to failure. Besides, such a campaign would be open
to abuse and instrumentalization. The USA cannot afford to set the agenda
in an unconvincing way.
3 - Global Democracy vs Democratic Imperialism
Can democracy be brought with bombs? No German should find this question
easy to answer. Germans and Americans certainly share the desire for a world
as democratic as possible. The disagreement here concerns the means to get
there and the price to pay. Should it be long-term economic, cultural and
political engagment ending with a non-violent revolution from within or
should it be short-term military confrontation followed by occupation and
externally imposed reeducation? And is an effort to introduce democracy
always and everywhere preferable to peace and stability? In military confrontation
the cost in human lives is high. In some totalitarian regimes, the cost
of inaction is high. The pacifist and the human rights streams in the German
and especially in the Green soul are not always reconcilable in these matters.
The answer to these questions cannot be a general one, it has to be a case
by case assessment of the specific situation. Maybe Germans and Europeans
should not take the calls for the removal of tyranny too lightly.
Yet Americans certainly need to consider the limits and the paradox of a
strictly military democratic interventionism. While the UN is not an institution
of global democracy yet, waging a war in the name of democracy against the
majority of member states and against the majority of global public opinion
is a questionable move towards a more democratic world.
4 - The Status of International Law and the UN
I already mentioned that in the long run, the lead nation will not be able
to exercise its power by ignoring or possibly instrumentalizing the United
Nations. Americans will have to come back to the UN because they need its
legitimacy. They need to convince the world that American power is still
good for the world. That also means that the US may sometimes simply have
to accept the decisions of this body, even if they are not welcome. Otherwise,
the UN will be perceived as a mere instrument of American power and loose
all credibility.
On the other hand, Germans and Europeans may have to further acknowledge the fact that there are problems with international law. If international law gives the cover of state sovereignty for humanitarian abuses and for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to privatized terror networks, then it needs reform. Germany has reacted to these imperfections in the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan. Maybe the "emerging doctrine of the limits of sovereignty" is something worth thinking about more. And ultimately there will be discussions about the architecture of the security council, constructed in 1945, possibly imperfect for the 21st century?
These are just some of the questions we have to answer to redefine the transatlantic relations and certainly both sides need to move. The transatlantic dialogue is most definitely not at its conclusion. What is immensely crucial for the entire debate is obviously the outcome of the war and the subsequent peace in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We disagreed with American plans and actions in the case of Iraq, based on our assessments of the threats and the risks and the effects for people in the region. We sincerely hope, that America was right! If the outcome of the Anglo-American war and post war peace in Iraq is successful, ending with democracy in Iraq, a new stability in the region, a limited number of casualties and with people in the Arab world broadly benefiting from this, then we will speak differently in the future. But if the tragic story of this area of the world is unfolding in further and more dreadful ways as a result of the war, then we expect America to exercise its great virtue of self-criticism and to act differently in the future. The USA may become even more powerful then.